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THE NON-RATIFICATION OF MIXED AGREEMENTS: LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS
GUILLAUME VAN DER LOO AND RAMSES A. WESSEL*
Abstract
The 2016 referendum in the Netherlands on the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement and the Walloon objection in Belgium to sign CETA triggered
the question of the consequences of the non-ratification of mixed
agreements that are (to be) concluded between the EU, its Member States
and one or more third parties. This non-ratification would lead to
so-called “incomplete” mixed agreements. The present article discusses
the legal problems connected to incomplete agreements and points to the
differences between bilateral and multilateral agreements. Now that
mixity seems to be have become more common – due to the wider scope of
Free Trade Agreements – and EU citizens and their parliaments become
more outspoken with respect to the content of these agreements, it seems
just a matter of time before we are faced with problems of non-ratification.
The unclear division of external competences between the EU and its
Member States makes it difficult to offer clear-cut solutions. Overall,
however, it does not seem advisable to rely on ex post facto solutions for
non-ratification problems; we may have to find ways to allow potential
problems to be on the negotiation table at an earlier stage.
1. Introduction
The 2016 referendum in the Netherlands on the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement1 triggered the question of the consequences of a possible Dutch
* Guillaume Van der Loo is postdoctoral researcher at the Ghent European Law Institute
(FWO) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). Ramses A. Wessel is Professor of
International and European Law and Governance at the University of Twente, Netherlands.
This article benefited from the valuable comments by anonymous reviewers of this journal.
1. Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one
part, and Ukraine, of the other part (O.J. 2014, L 161/3). The referendum was the first that was
organized on the basis of the new Dutch Advisory Referendum Act, which allows for a
non-binding advice of the population on acts that have already been approved by Parliament.
The turnout was low (32%) but just enough to render the result valid. Of that 32%, 61.1% of the
voters indicated being against the approval act: a small minority of the total electorate in the
Netherlands and, indeed, a very small fraction of the combined electorates in the other EU
Member States and Ukraine. See further Van der Loo, “The Dutch referendum on the
Common Market Law Review 54: 735–770, 2017.
© 2017 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
non-ratification of that agreement. Subsequently, in October 2016, the EU and
Canada were confronted with a situation in which one of the Belgian regions,
Wallonia, threatened to block not the ratification, but even the signing of an
international agreement, CETA,2 the trade agreement between the EU, its
Member States and Canada. Similar situations may arise in the case of other
planned international agreements. This contribution is not about the question
of whether referendums are fit to be used in relation to international
agreements that have been negotiated over a period of many years and de facto
become subject to the preferences of perhaps a very small fraction of the
population in the EU and the involved third country/countries. Nor is it about
the question to what extent sub-national authorities should be able to play a
role in international relations. Rather, it aims to answer a new and somewhat
practical legal question: what are the legal consequences if one of the EU
Member States is unable or unwilling to sign or ratify an agreement that was
negotiated between the EU, its Member States and one or more third parties?
The question flows from the fact that these cases deal with so-called mixed
agreements: agreements to which both the EU and its Member States are a
party. These mixed agreements can be bilateral (EU/Member State and third
party) or multilateral (the EU, its Member States and usually many other
States are all individual parties to the agreement).3 In the case of bilateral
agreements, the EU and its Member States are presented as one party despite
the need for all of them to sign and ratify the agreement. Entry into force
depends on both the EU and the Member States having ratified the agreement,
and they remain responsible on the basis of their respective competences. In
the case of multilateral mixed agreements, the EU and its Member States are
more clearly parties in their own right, despite the fact that also in these cases
third States often request clarity as to the division of competences.4
The legal reason to opt for a mixed agreement, rather than for a so-called
“EU-only” agreement, is that the agreement falls partly within the
competences of the Union and partly within the competences of the Member
States. Whereas mixity is mandatory when an agreement partly falls within
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: What’s next?”, (2017) Netherlands Yearbook of
International Law 2016, (forthcoming).
2. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was finally signed at the
EU-Canada Summit on 30 Oct. 2016 (O.J. 2017, L 11/23).
3. See more generally on mixed agreements, Heliskoski,MixedAgreements as aTechnique
for Organizing the External Relations of the European Community and its Member States
(Kluwer Law International, 2001); as well as the various contributions to Hillion and Koutrakos
(Eds.), Mixed Agreements in EU Law Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World
(Hart Publishing, 2010).
4. Delgado Casteleiro, “EU declarations of competence to multilateral agreements: A
useful reference base?”, (2012) EFA Rev., 491–510.
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exclusive Union competences and partly within Member State competences,5
it is optional if it covers an area of shared competences (whether or not
together with areas falling within exclusive EU competences).6 In the case of
the latter, the choice between a mixed agreement or an EU-only agreement is
a matter for the discretion of the Council.7 If an agreement covers exclusive
Union competences only, mixity is excluded. In this case, the agreement can
cover a priori exclusive Union competences, identified by Article 3(1) TFEU,
and/or supervening Union exclusive competences, through the operation of
the so-called ERTA doctrine and Opinion 1/76 principles, enshrined in Article
3(2) TFEU.8
At the same time, it is clear that the choice for mixity is not always purely
legal. This is despite the Court’s observation that the need for unity or rapidity
of EU external action, or the procedural difficulties which may arise from
mixity, cannot change the answer who has competence to conclude an
agreement.9 As openly phrased by EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia
Malmström in relation to CETA: “From a strict legal standpoint, the
Commission considers this agreement to fall within exclusive EU
competence. However, the political situation in the Council is clear, and we
understand the need for proposing it as a ‘mixed’ agreement, in order to allow
for a speedy signature.”10 Usually, the Commission’s pragmatism results in
the opposite view: as the ratification process of mixed agreements can easily
5. As A.G. Kokott famously mentioned in her Opinion in Case C-13/07, Commission v.
Council (removed from the register) individual provisions falling within the competences of
Member States, however secondary, “infect” the agreement as a whole and trigger mixity (i.e.
the so-called “Pastis doctrine”) EU:C:2009:190, para 121. However, this argument was never
explicitly recognized by the Court.
6. For a more detailed classification of mixed agreements, centred on the scope and nature
of the EU’s competences, see Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (OUP, 2013),
183–186; Rosas, “Mixed Union–Mixed agreements”, in Koskenniemi (Ed.), International Law
Aspects of the European Union (Kluwer Law International, 1998) pp. 125–148. However,
according to Eeckhout, the practice of mixity does not readily lend itself to such attempts
(Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2011)).
7. Opinion of A.G. Wahl, in Opinion 3/15, EU:C:2016:657, paras. 111–120; Opinion of
A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (pending),
EU:C:2016:992 paras. 73–75.
8. On the difference between a priori exclusivity and supervening exclusivity, see
Dashwood, “Mixity in the era of the Treaty of Lisbon”, in Hillion and Koutrakos, op. cit. supra
note 3, pp. 351–366; Rosas, “EU external relations: exclusive competence revisited”, (2015)
Fordham International Law Journal, 1073–1096; and De Baere, “EU external action”, in
Barnard and Peers (Eds.) European Union Law (OUP, 2014), pp. 704–750.
9. Opinions 1/94 of 15 Nov. 1994, EU:C:1994:384, para 107, and 1/08 of 30 Nov. 2009,
EU:C:2009:739, para 127.
10. Commission – Press release “European Commission proposes signature and conclusion
of EU-Canada trade deal”, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm>.
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take years (and indeed runs the risk of being slowed-down by national
parliamentary objections or referendums), “EU-only” agreements are the
preferred option when and where possible. The Member States (and the
Council) on the other hand often prefer the mixed formula. The national
ratification process equips the Member States with a veto-right, nullifying the
qualified majority voting in the Council,11 and increases their presence and
visibility during the process of concluding the agreement and on the
international stage.
However, mixity also has a positive side. As discussed in detail below,
mixed agreements don’t require a clear vertical delimitation of competences
between the EU and the Member States, which allows the EU to go ahead with
ambitious agreements without getting stuck in endless competence battles. As
observed by Advocate General Sharpston, “the mixed agreement is itself a
creature of pragmatic forces – a means of resolving the problems posed by the
need for international agreements in a multi-layered system”.12 Therefore,
mixity is not always the result of a strict legal review of the Union’s
competences, but is often a political decision. Maresceau even argues that “if
there is political consensus among the Member States that an agreement ought
to be mixed, they will almost certainly manage to impose the mixed procedure,
particularly by adding provisions which stand on their own and need Member
State involvement.”13
However, in other cases the Member States may want to avoid mixity, for
example when a swift ratification is deemed required. For political reasons,
mixity was also avoided for the conclusion of the EU-Kosovo Association
Agreement (AA). Although AAs are traditionally mixed, the EU-Kosovo AA
was concluded as an EU-only agreement because several Member States
wanted to avoid a de facto recognition of Kosovo through their national
ratification procedure of the agreement.14
While the popular view may be that the EU is increasingly taking over
international relations from its Member States,15 mixed agreements seem to
be here to stay. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we found 31
11. Art. 218(8) TFEU.
12. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie,
EU:C:2010:436, para 56.
13. Maresceau, “A typology of mixed bilateral agreements”, in Hillion and Koutrakos op.
cit. supra note 3, pp. 11–29 at 16.
14. Van Elsuwege, “The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and
Kosovo: An example of legal creativity”, 2017 forthcoming.
15. See more extensively on this question: Wessel, “Can the European Union replace its
Member States in international affairs? An international law perspective”, in Govaere, Lannon,
et al. (Eds.), The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), pp. 129–147.
CML Rev. 2017738 Van der Loo andWessel
international agreements that were signed as mixed agreements.16 Mixed
agreements still cover a wide range of policy areas, including those that
primarily fall within the EU’s exclusive competences. Just as in the
pre-Lisbon era, all broad framework agreements, such as Association
Agreements or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) are mixed.17
Paradoxically, despite the broadening of the Common Commercial Policy
(CCP) in Lisbon Treaty,18 also all post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) have been signed as mixed agreements.19 Moreover, in Opinion 2/15
Advocate General Sharpston came to the conclusion that also the
EU-Singapore FTA needs to be concluded by the EU and the Member States
acting jointly, because the agreement covers several provisions falling within
shared competences, and even one falling within the exclusive competences of
the Member States.20 If the Court were to follow this reasoning, the future of
similar envisaged ambitious EU FTAs, such as TTIP or the EU-Japan FTA,
also looks mixed. In addition, several sectoral agreements, for example in the
area of aviation and environment, were concluded by the Union and the
Member States jointly.21 Perhaps ironically, an area which is not at all
characterized by mixity is the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy;
CFSP and CSDP agreements are exclusively concluded by the Union.22
16. Authors’ own calculation on the basis of a combined reading of the EU Treaties Office
Database <ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do> and the Council’s database of
agreements <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/>.
17. See e.g. the EU-Georgia AA (O.J. 2014, L 261/4), the EU-New Zealand Partnership
Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (O.J. 2016, L 321/3) and the EU-Mongolia
Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (O.J. 2012, L 134/4).
18. See quite extensively Bungenberg and Herrmann (Eds.), Common Commercial Policy
after Lisbon (Springer, 2013).
19. This is the case for both “stand-alone” FTAs (e.g. CETA, cited supra note 2, and the
EU-Korea FTA, O.J. 2011, L 127/6) and FTAs included in broader (association) agreements
(e.g. the Deep and Comprehensive FTAs included in the Association Agreements concluded
with Georgia (cited supra note 17), Ukraine (cited supra note 1) and Moldova (O.J. 2014, L
260/4)). A notable exception is the FTA included in the EU-Kosovo AA (on this point, see Van
Elsuwege, op. cit. supra note 14).
20. See Opinion A.G. Sharpston, in Opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.
The provisions where, according to the A.G., the EU shares its competence with the Member
States are mentioned in para 562 of the Opinion. The provision of the FTA concerning the
termination of bilateral investment agreements concluded between the Member States and
Singapore falls, according to the A.G., within Member State competences (para 563).
21. See e.g. the EU-Jordan Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement (O.J. 2012, L 334/3);
and the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (O.J. 2013, L 46/4).
22. See recently also Wessel, “Lex Imperfecta: Law and integration in European Foreign
and Security Policy”, (2016) European Papers: A Journal on Law and Integration, No. 2,
439–468.
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Irrespective of the EU’s own global ambitions – as for instance reflected in
Article 3(5) and 21 TEU – Member States have thus proven to be
indispensable parties to many of the international legal relationships the
Union entered into. Despite the extension of EU exclusivity in the area of
Common Commercial Policy,23 the post-Lisbon external relations regime
remains unclear as far as the exact competence division is concerned, leaving
the Court of Justice of the European Union to decide on the line of
demarcation between EU and Member State external competences.24
Given that the non-ratification of mixed agreements is not part of the daily
practice of the EU and its Member States, one could rightfully question the
practical relevance of the issues raised by the present contribution.At the same
time, these are questions that become more and more relevant now that
Member States (but perhaps above all their citizens) show an increasing
awareness of the impact of international agreements and openly consider not
ratifying certain agreements. While, on the one hand mixity may be an
attractive option as it serves as a convenient political escape from the “jungle
of external competences”,25 the non-ratification by one or several Member
State(s) would trigger several complex legal questions.
The consequences of non-ratification of a mixed agreement, in particular
bilateral mixed agreements, are hardly covered in the existing literature26 or
the case law of the Court of Justice.27 Therefore the aim of the present
contribution is to clarify a number of legal questions related to the
non-ratification of mixed agreements. In particular, the practice and legal
challenges for the conclusion of incomplete mixed agreements will be
analysed.28 These would be mixed agreements concluded by the Union and
23. Art. 207 TFEU extended the scope of the CCP as to encompass not only trade in goods
but also trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct
investment. See further Bungenberg and Herrmann, op. cit. supra note 18.
24. See e.g. Case C-414/11,Daiichi SankyoCo. Ltd and Sanofi-Aventis DeutschlandGmbH
v. DEMO Anonimos Viomikhaniki kai Emporiki Etairia Farmakon, EU:C:2013:520; Opinion
3/15, Marrakesh Treaty related to the question of EU exclusive competence in the area of
copyrights of published works for persons with reading disabilities, EU:C:2017:114 and
Opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (pending).
25. Klamert, op. cit. supra note 6, at 184.
26. For notable exceptions, see Dolmans, Problems of Mixed Agreements (Asser Institute,
1985); Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 3; and Kleimann and Kübek, “The signing, provisional
application, and conclusion of trade and investment agreements in the EU. The case of CETA
and Opinion 2/15” (2016), EUI Working Papers 2016/58.
27. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15.
28. The term “incomplete” mixed agreements was introduced by Schermers, “A typology
of mixed agreements”, in O’Keeffe and Schermers (Eds.), Mixed Agreements (Kluwer Law,
1983), p. 26. Also Rosas discusses this concept (Rosas, “The European Union and mixed
agreements”, in Dashwood and Hillion (Eds.), The General Law of EC External Relations
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp. 203–204). Hix uses the term “imperfect” mixed agreements to
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several, but not all, Member States. After the ratification by the Union and the
other Member States, such “incomplete” mixed agreements would fully enter
into force in the territory of the ratifying Member States (i.e. covering both the
Union and Member States’ competences of the agreement). In this scenario,
Member State(s) that did not ratify the agreement would (only) be bound by
the areas of the agreement falling within the competences of the Union
pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU. Whereas the conclusion of such incomplete
mixed agreements seems an attractive option in case a single Member State
would refuse to ratify a mixed agreement, it will be illustrated that several key
features of mixed agreements complicate such a scenario, in particular in the
case of bilateral mixed agreements.
This article will first analyse the legal implications of non-ratification by
one, or several, Member States for the conclusion of the agreement (2) and the
practice of incomplete mixed agreements (3). Then, the legal hurdles for the
conclusion of such incomplete mixed agreements are discussed (4), focusing
on ratification coordination between the EU and the Member States (4.1) and
the lack of a clear delimitation of competences between these parties (4.2).
Thereafter, the implications of such a non-ratification on the provisional
application of mixed agreements is explored (5). Finally, some alternative
solutions are formulated that could contribute to overcoming the legal
deadlock of non-ratification by a Member State (6).
2. Legal consequences of non-ratification for the conclusion of
mixed agreements
Even in the case of bilateral mixed agreements, both the Union and its
Member States are contracting parties.29 When such an agreement is
negotiated, each of the parties will have to act within the boundaries of their
own competences.30 This is often underlined by the preamble, where it
provides that the agreement is concluded between the third country, of the one
part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, jointly
referred to as “the Parties”.31 Significantly, several mixed agreements include
a clause defining the term “Parties” as “the Union or its Member States, or
the Union and its Member States, in accordance with their respective
describe this phenomenon (Hix, “Mixed agreements in the field of Judicial Cooperation in Civil
Matters: Treaty-making and legal effects” in Martenczuk and Van Thiel (Eds.) Justice, Liberty,
Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations (Brussels University Press, 2008), pp.
211–256).
29. Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:1994:76, para 29.
30. Case 28/12, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2015:282, para 47.
31. See e.g. CETA.
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competences, on the one hand, and [the third country], on the other”.32
Therefore, in order to express their consent to be bound by the agreement, both
the individual Member States and the Union are to sign the agreement.33
Usually the Council decision on the signature (and provisional application) of
the agreement authorizes the President of the Council to designate the
person(s) empowered to sign the agreement on behalf of the Union, whereas
the different national constitutional procedures prescribe who will sign the
agreement for their respective Member State. In order to enter into force, the
specific procedures included in the agreements, need to be fulfilled.34
Non-ratification of a multilateral mixed agreement by one (or several)
Member States is as such not always problematic because most agreements
can enter into force once a number of signatory States have ratified the
agreement.35 Therefore, the agreement can enter into force, including for the
EU, without the participation of several Member States, leading to what
we referred to above as an “incomplete” multilateral mixed agreement. These
agreements become less “incomplete” when Member States join at a later
stage, something that is occasionally expressly allowed for in the Council
Decision concluding the agreement.36 The situation for bilateral mixed
agreements is more complex as these include an entry into force-clause stating
that the agreement can only enter into force after all “the Parties” have
deposited their respective instrument of ratification or approval.37 Thus, if one
Member State refused to ratify an agreement, the treaty bond would appear to
32. E.g. Art. 55 EU-New Zealand Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (O.J. 2016, L
304/1); Art. 34 EU-Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement (O.J. 2016, L 329/45) and Art.
482 of the EU-Ukraine AA.
33. Art. 12(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
34. Art. 14(1) VCLT.
35. E.g., the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change enters into force when at least 55 Parties to the Convention, accounting in total
for at least an estimated 55 % of the total global greenhouse gas emissions, have deposited their
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession (Art. 21(1)) (O.J. 2016, L 282/4).
After the EU’s ratification in October 2016 both thresholds were crossed so that the agreement
could enter into force on 4 Nov. 2016.
36. In 2012 the EU acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast
Asia and the European External Action Service (EEAS) confirmed in a 2006 Council
Declaration that the EU’s accession to the TAC in relation to CFSP areas was “without
prejudice to Member States’ right to accede to the TAC, and to act independently in relation to
the same areas, save where they are required to comply with a Joint Action or Common Position
adopted under the TEU.” Referred to in Miller, “EU External Agreements: EU and UK
procedures”, House of Commons Briefing Paper, No CBP 7192, 28 March 2016.
37. Art. 486(2) Ukraine AA; Art. 15.10 Korea FTA (cited supra note 19); Art. 138
EU-Serbia AA (O.J. 2013, L 278/16). In most cases the General Secretariat of the Council is the
Depositary of the Agreement. Other agreements require that the Parties notify each other of the
completion of their respective legal procedures (e.g. Art. 58(1) EU-New Zealand Partnership
Agreement on Relations and Cooperation, cited supra note 32).
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remain incomplete,38 and the agreement cannot enter into force. It has to be
noted that if a Member State has decided that it will not ratify an agreement, it
needs to notify this to the other party in conformity with the procedures of the
agreement.39 Thus, the mere rejection of a mixed agreement by a national
parliament or referendum in a Member State has no legal implications beyond
the domestic legal order as long as there is no notification of the
non-ratification.
Significantly, the refusal of a single Member State to ratify a bilateral mixed
agreement implies that the agreement cannot enter into force for the EU and
the remaining Member States, even in the case when they all have completed
their respective ratification procedures (together with the third State).
However, in practice the EU only ratifies mixed bilateral agreements after all
the Member States have done so (cf. below). This would mean that a Member
State can block the EU from exercising its competences, even with regard to
those areas of mixed agreements falling within exclusive Union
competences.40 We would maintain that the principle of exclusivity, as
enshrined in Article 2(1) TFEU, precludes Member States from vetoing the
application of those areas of a mixed agreement that fall within EU exclusive
powers.41 The Court has held that for mixed agreements both the European
Union and the Member States must act within the framework of the
competences which they have while respecting the competences of any other
contracting party.42 It is true that, in principle, each Party (including the
Member States) must choose between either consenting to or rejecting
the entire agreement. However, that choice must be made in accordance with
the Treaty rules on the allocation of competences.43 Therefore, the ratification
procedure of the Member States can only cover the elements of the agreement
falling within their competences, i.e. provisions falling within exclusive
Member State competences or within shared competences that are not
exercised by the Union or which did not became exclusive through the ERTA
doctrine. The Council decision concluding the agreement for the Union can
only cover the elements falling within Union competences.
Although Member States remain free after their signature to ratify those
provisions of the agreements falling within their own competences, this
freedom is not absolute. Under international law, Member States are obliged
not to defeat the object and purpose of the agreement (Art. 18(a) VCLT) and,
38. Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 3, at 92.
39. Art. 65(1) and 67(2) VCLT. In practice, the notification will need to be send to the other
Party, and/or the Depository of the agreement.
40. Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 3, 92–95.
41. On this point, see also Kleimann and Kübek, op. cit. supra, note 26, at 23.
42. Case C-28/12, Commission v. Council, para 47.
43. A.G. Sharpston, Opinion in Opinion 2/15, para 568.
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according to EU law, they are bound by the duty of sincere cooperation
expressed in Article 4(3) TEU.44 The Court has held on various occasions that,
where the subject of an agreement falls partly within the competence of the
EU and partly within that of its Member States, it is essential to ensure close
cooperation between the Member States and the EU institutions, both in
the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the
commitments entered into. This flows from the requirement of unity in the
international representation of the Union.45 The Court even explicitly
recognized this principle with regard to the ratification of mixed
agreements.46 Moreover, the Court held that the duty of cooperation “is of
general application and does not depend either on whether the Community
[now Union] competence concerned is exclusive or on any right of the
Member States to enter into obligations towards non-member countries”47
With regard to mixed agreements, the Court has indeed established specific
procedural obligations that stem from the duty of cooperation. For example, in
theMOX Plant case on the mixed UNCLOS agreement, the Court prescribed
a duty of the Member States “to inform and consult” the Community (now
Union) before launching dispute settlement procedures against another
Member State.48 It has been argued that the duty of cooperation even implies
that both the Member States and the EU need to refrain from acting in a way
that would make the ratification of a mixed agreement more difficult.49
However, whereas the duty of cooperation implies that Member States should
refrain from actions that “call in question the EU’s capacity for independent
action in its external relations”,50 this principle cannot be stretched so as to
oblige Member States to ratify a mixed agreement. If this were the case, one
would fail to see the meaning of national ratifications in the first place.
Moreover, this would basically violate the fundamental international law
notion that a “consent to be bound” can only be expressed voluntarily.51
44. See e.g. Hillion, “Mixity and coherence in EU external relations:The significance of the
duty of cooperation”, in Hillion and Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 87–115; as well as
Klamert, op. cit. supra note 6.
45. See, inter alia, Opinions 1/94 of 15 Nov. 1994, EU:C:1994:384, para 108, and 2/00 of
6 Dec. 2001, EU:C:2001:664, para 18; and Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden,
EU:C:2010:203, para 73, and Case C-28/12, Commission v. Council, para 54.
46. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention 170, EU:C:1993:106, para 38. Ironically, ILO
Convention 170 (at issue in Opinion 2/91) has been ratified by 7 EU Member States only.
47. Case C-226/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, para 58; Case C-246/07 PFOS,
EU:C:2010:203, para 64.
48. Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant), EU:C:2006:345, para 179.
49. C. Hillion, op. cit. supra note 44, at p. 101.
50. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, Case C-28/12, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2015:43,
para 63.
51. Cf. Art. 51 VLCT on the coercion to express a consent to be bound.
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Member States are parties to the agreement as sovereign States, “not as a mere
appendage of the European Union”.52 However, the duty of cooperation can be
read as an obligation to initiate the national ratification procedure (e.g.
parliamentary approval procedure), but without influencing the outcome of
this procedure. It can even be interpreted as including a “best efforts”
obligation to try to ratify the agreement, in particular after the agreement has
been signed. Such a best efforts obligation could perhaps stem not only from
Article 18(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), but also
from the fact that on several occasions during the negotiation process, but
before its signature, Member States have the possibility to express their
concerns or objections with regard to (parts of) the envisaged agreement (e.g.
when authorizing the opening of the negotiations and during the adoption of
the negotiating directives; in the specific Council committee monitoring and
assisting the negotiator (e.g. the Trade Policy Committee); and when adopting
the Council decision signing the agreement). However, it is true that only in
the exceptional cases listed in Article 218(8) TFEU requiring unanimity in the
Council, can a Member State block this process.
In the context of the duty of cooperation, it has also been argued that the
reason and interest of a Member State to delay or refuse the ratification of a
mixed agreement is decisive.53 While, in general, the national interest does not
form an argument to escape EU obligations, Klamert argues that Article 4(3)
TEU only excuses a Member State for delaying or withholding ratification “if
the Member State has good reasons to do so”.54 We see this as a somewhat
tricky exception and it would certainly not apply, as recognized by that author,
if a Member State delayed ratification to, for instance, extract commercial
concessions from a third country. Also the area of competence covered by the
specific reason to delay or refuse the ratification could be relevant. In line with
our analysis above,Advocate General Sharpston argued that if a Member State
refused to conclude a mixed agreement for reasons relating to aspects of that
agreement for which the EU enjoys exclusive external competence, that
Member State would be acting in breach of the Treaty rules on the allocation
of competences.55
It has been noted that a Member State’s refusal to ratify an agreement can
also block the Union’s ratification of the agreement. As discussed below,
traditionally the Union only ratifies the agreement (i.e. by adopting the
52. A.G. Sharpston, Opinion in Opinion 2/15, para 77.
53. Klamert also argues that the stronger and more specific the interest of the Union in the
expeditious entry into force of an agreement is, the stronger the obligation on the Member
States to ratify (op. cit. supra note 6).
54. Ibid, p. 202.
55. A.G. Sharpston, Opinion in Opinion 2/15, para 568.
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Council decision concluding the agreement) after all the Member States have
do so. If in the process of the national ratification procedures a Member State
decides not to ratify the agreement, for example due to the outcome of
parliamentary procedures or a referendum, that Member State can also “veto”
the Union’s ratification if the mixed agreement requires a unanimous vote
in the Council.56 For instance, in the light of the outcome of the referendum on
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the Dutch Government can, in
addition to not ratifying the agreement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
also block the Council decision for the conclusion of the Agreement.
Thus, if a Member State chooses to exercise its right not to ratify a bilateral
mixed agreement, by the same token, it de facto blocks the entry into force of
the entire agreement, including those elements falling within Union
competences. Such a move could be considered as a breach of the duty of
sincere cooperation because the Member State would preclude the Union
from exercising its competences. “Incomplete” bilateral mixed agreements
provide a way out of this legal deadlock,57 as they allow the Union and the
other Member States that have ratified the agreement to go ahead. However, as
noted above, currently this is possible for multilateral agreements only, as
bilateral mixed agreements require that all the Parties ratify the agreement.
3. The practice of incomplete mixed agreements
As a rule, the European Union only ratifies a bilateral mixed agreement once
the Member States have done so, which makes examples of incomplete
bilateral mixed agreements hard to find.58 There are, however, examples of
mixed agreements that required a very long ratification period or the
conclusion of which was jeopardized by a single Member State that wanted to
56. The Council decides with QMV, unless the agreement falls under one of the exceptions
mentioned in Art. 218(8) TFEU (e.g. Association Agreements or agreements covering a field
for which unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union act), or if the Council deviates from
the Commission proposal (Art. 293 TFEU). See also the unanimity requirement in Art. 207(4)
TFEU.
57. Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 3, at 95 and 130–133; Dolmans, op. cit. supra note 26, at
64; Kleimann and Kübek, op. cit. supra note 26, at 27.
58. A notable exception is the Agreement between the European Union and its Member
States, on the one part, and Iceland, on the other part, concerning Iceland’s participation in the
joint fulfilment of the commitments of the European Union, its Member States and Iceland for
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (O.J. 2015, L 207/17).This bilateral mixed agreement is already
concluded by the Union, but not yet by all the Member States. For the specific context of the
conclusion of this agreement, see the Commission’s proposal for the decision concluding this
agreement (COM(2014)290).
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extract some last-minute concessions.59 Nevertheless, several cases of
“incomplete” multilateral mixed agreements exist. Numerous multilateral
mixed agreements have been concluded by the Union (or before that, the
Community) prior to a conclusion by all the Member States. Several of them
were even never ratified by some Member States, because these States have
the intention to remain outside the agreement indefinitely.60 Yet, these
Member States never notified the depositary of the agreement or the other
contracting Parties, leaving the ratification procedure incomplete. Other
agreements are temporarily incomplete because the non-participating
Member States still have the intention to conclude the agreement, but were for
various reasons not yet able to do so. For example, the EU ratified the UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, although the Council
decision concluding the agreement recognized that several Member States
still need to ratify the agreement.61 Or more recently, on 4 October 2016 the
EU adopted the decision on the conclusion of the Paris Agreement adopted
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(hereinafter “the Paris Agreement”).62 A few days later, on 7 October, the EU
deposited its instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the UN
together with only seven EU Member States.63 The other Member States still
need to deposit their instrument of ratification once they have completed their
national procedures.
In addition, there is a situation in which even bilateral mixed agreements
may become “incomplete”. This risk in particular emerges after the accession
of new EU Member States. After joining the EU, the new Member States
need to accede to the set of existing EU mixed agreements (either concluded
or only signed) through accession protocols.64 Such accession protocols are in
themselves mixed agreements. Therefore, mixed agreements remain
“incomplete” as long as a new EU Member State does not join the agreement.
59. There was for example the quite well-known episode where Italy initially refused to
ratify the agreement with South-Africa until “a deal” concerning grappa was designed
(reported by Rosas in “The Future of Mixity”, in Hillion and Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 3).
For an example of a long ratification period, the Agreement on Cooperation and Customs
Union between the European Economic Community and San Marino was signed in December
1991 and entered into force in May 2002 (O.J. 2002, L 84/43).
60. Dolmans noted that an agreement can only be considered incomplete if one or more of
the “interested” Member States don’t take part, i.e. when the Union’s ratification would have
consequences for a Member State that did itself not ratify the agreement (op. cit. supra note 26,
at 64).
61. Recital 4 of Council Decision 2004/579/EC on the conclusion of the UN Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime (O.J. 2004, L 161/69).
62. Council Decision 2016/1841 on the conclusion of the Paris Agreement adopted under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (O.J. 2016, L 282/1).
63. See supra note 35.
64. See e.g. Art. 6 Act of Accession with the Republic of Croatia (O.J. 2012, L 112/6).
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However, in order to mitigate the temporary gap between the day of EU
accession and participation to the EU’s mixed agreements, the acts of
accession provide for a simplified procedure: they empower the Council to
conclude, on behalf of the Member States, such accession protocols to the
existing mixed agreements.65 This reduces the ratification burdens on the
EU’s side.66 Moreover, the acts of accession also oblige the new Member
States “as from the date of accession, and pending the entry into force of the
necessary protocols” to apply the provisions of the mixed agreement
concluded before their accession to the agreement.67 Several mixed
agreements also include specific provisions stating that any new Member
State of the EU will accede to the agreement from the date of its accession to
the EU by means of a clause to that effect in the act of accession to the EU. If
the act of accession does not provide for the automatic accession of the new
Member State to this agreement, the Member State concerned needs to accede
to the agreement by depositing an act of accession to this agreement.68
Finally, both bilateral and multilateral mixed agreements can become
incomplete at a later stage, in particular if Member States withdraw from an
agreement (something of which we have not been able to find an example).
While this may not be an obvious scenario (in particular in a bilateral context),
these days it is no longer completely theoretical that, for instance, a change of
government leads to different priorities in a Member State. Furthermore,
something that looks like “complete incompleteness”, at least in relation to
bilateral agreements, can be foreseen if a Member State decides to leave the
Union. However, it is important to underline that in this situation it would be
a political rather than a legal problem, as the former Member State has become
a third State, so that the agreement would legally not be incomplete. If
the withdrawing Member State wants to remain a party to a mixed agreement,
a legal instrument (for instance a protocol) would be required stating that the
withdrawing Member State takes over the rights and obligations it previously
had under the agreement as an EU Member State and that it joins the
agreement as a third party. In all likelihood, this would trigger negotiations to
accommodate unforeseen practical problems. Obviously, such a legal
instrument would need to be ratified by the EU, its 27 Member States, the third
65. See e.g. Art. 6(2) of the Act of Accession of Croatia (Ibid.). A similar provision can be
found in Art. 6(2) of the Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania (O.J. 2005, L 157).
66. Czuczai, “Mixity in practice: Some problems and their (real or possible) solutions”, in
Hillion and Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 229–248 at 238.
67. Art. 6(4) Act of Accession Bulgaria and Romania and Art. 6(3) Act of Accession
Croatia. Art. 6(6) of the 2003 Act of Accession of the ten new Member Stated even explicitly
listed several mixed agreements (O.J. 2003, L 236/33).
68. Art. 30.10(5) CETA.
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party and the withdrawing Member State.69 Furthermore, this would change
the nature of a bilateral agreement to a multilateral agreement.
4. Legal hurdles for incomplete mixed agreements
Apart from possibly being precluded by procedural rules enshrined in bilateral
mixed agreements (requiring the ratification of all the contracting parties),
“incomplete mixity” is also complicated by two key features of mixed
agreements. The first relates to the lack of clear rules on who should ratify the
mixed agreements and when. Is the Union required to wait until all the
Member States have done so? Or can the EU already move forward and ratify
the agreement regardless of the Member States’ national ratification
procedures? The second issue relates to the absence of a clear delimitation of
competences between the Union and Member States. Both issues are
discussed below.
4.1. Ratification coordination
Non-ratification by one or several Member States of a bilateral mixed
agreement is complicated by the fact that the Treaties do not establish rules on
how to negotiate and conclude such agreements.70 The concept of mixed
agreements is even absent in the post-Lisbon regime and – with the exception
of the accession of the EU to the ECHR – Article 218 TFEU does not even
acknowledge the possibility for the Union to conclude agreements jointly with
the Member States.71 Thus, primary law does not specify how the Union and
its Member States should coordinate their ratification procedure, or what to
do in case of non-ratification of a Member State. It is unclear whether, with
regard to bilateral mixed agreements, the Union is required to deposit its
ratification after all the Member States have done so (thus excluding
incomplete mixity), or whether the EU and the Member States should notify
their ratification simultaneously. Only the Euratom Treaty is clear on this
point, as Article 102 EAEC states that international agreements concluded
with a third State to which “in addition to the Community, one or more
69. On this point, see Van der Loo and Blockmans, “The impact of Brexit on the EU’s
International Agreements”,CEPS Commentary, 15 July 2016; as well as Łazowski and Wessel,
“The external dimension of withdrawal from the European Union”, (2017) Revue des Affaires
Européennes (forthcoming).
70. On this point, see Dolmas, op. cit. supra note 26, at 60.
71. The Nice version of the Treaty only provided for mixity in Art. 133(6) EC.
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Member States are parties” shall not enter into force until the Commission has
been notified by all the Member States concerned that those agreements have
been ratified according to their respective national laws.
Obviously, the coordination of the ratification procedure between the EU
and the Member States is also of interest to the other contracting parties, as
they can only be sure that the EU and the Member States will be able to respect
their commitments if they both ratify the agreement. It has been argued that,
for legal certainty, both the Union and its Member States need to deposit the
instruments of ratification as far as possible jointly, so that the agreement
can enter into force for the EU and all of its Member States at the same
time.72 Therefore, with regard to bilaterally structured mixed agreements
(such as most Association Agreements and Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements), a practice has been developed on the basis of which the Union
ratifies those agreements only after all the Member States have done so; this is
despite the absence of this requirement in the Council decisions approving the
signing or conclusion of these agreements.73 In very exceptional cases only,
the EU (i.e. the Council) encourages the Member States through the Council
decision to ratify the agreement by a specific date.74 This way the EU avoids
incomplete mixity. However, as mentioned above, this practice also implies
that a Member State can block the Union’s ratification of the agreement,
which goes against the allocation of the EU’s external competences. This also
explains why the Union still refrained from ratifying the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement. Only after the Netherlands’ deposit of its instrument
of ratification (the last Member State that still has to do so), will the Union
adopt the Council decision concluding the agreement.75
As mentioned above, the situation is rather different for multilateral mixed
agreements, as incomplete mixity is not unusual in this category. However, the
Union nevertheless often attempts to encourage the Member States to ratify
these agreements as soon as possible. Numerous Council decisions
concluding such mixed agreements call on the Member States to ratify these
agreements as rapidly as possible and to (try to) deposit their instrument of
72. Czuczai, op. cit. supra note 66, at 233.
73. Yet, see the above-mentioned Agreement between the European Union and its Member
States, and Iceland, in relation to the Kyoto Protocol (see supra note 58).
74. E.g., the preamble of the Council decision concluding the EU-Iceland Agreement
mentioned in the previous note states that in order to pursue the rapid entry into force of the
Doha Amendment, before the United Nations climate conference in Paris at the end of 2015,
“the Union, the Member States and Iceland should endeavour to ratify both the Doha
Amendment and the Agreement not later than the third quarter of 2015” (Council Decision
(EU) 2015/1340, O.J. 2015, L 207/15).
75. See on this particular situation Van der Loo (op. cit. supra note 1) as well as Wessel,
“The EU solution to deal with the Dutch referendum result on the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement”, (2016), European Papers, European Forum, 22 Dec. 2016, 1–5.
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ratification simultaneously with the Union.76 Other Council decisions just
encourage the Member States to deposit their instruments of ratification “as
soon as possible”, without envisaging a simultaneous deposit.77 Some Council
decisions even include a binding or indicative deadline before which the
Member States need to ratify.78 However, Member States are reluctant to
accept legal obligations to deposit their instrument of ratification at a
particular time or in a certain manner. To impose such a time limit would
however not affect the division of competences, as it only requires Member
States to exercise their competences in such a way as not to undermine the
Union’s exercise of its own competence – i.e. in line with the duty of sincere
cooperation. If a Member State “misses” such a deadline because it refuses to
initiate its national ratification procedure (e.g. parliamentary approval
procedure), the Commission could start an infringement procedure against
that Member State on the basis of Article 258 TFEU if there is a precise and
binding deadline enshrined in the Council decision. However, an infringement
procedure would not be an option to challenge a negative outcome of this
ratification procedure, because the Member State in question would merely
have exercised its sovereign rights.79 Therefore, there are only few examples
of a successful simultaneous ratification by the EU and its Member States80
and “incomplete” mixed multilateral agreements have become a common
practice in EU external relations.81 Significantly, several multilateral
76. For such examples in the Post-Lisbon era, see recital 5 of the Council Decision
2014/283/EU on the conclusion of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (O.J. 2014, L 150/231). Also the recent Council Decision concluding the
Paris Agreement states that “Member States shall endeavour to take the necessary steps with a
view to depositing instruments of ratification simultaneously with the Union or as soon as
possible thereafter” (see supra note 62). Significantly, both the Council and the European
Council called on the EU and the Member States to ratify the agreement “as soon as possible”
and “to endeavour to take the necessary steps with a view to deposit collectively their
ratification instruments with the UN Secretary General” (Council statement on the ratification
of the Paris Agreement, Press Release 360/12, 20 June 2016 and European Council conclusions
of 17 and 18 March 2016). For more examples before the Treaty of Lisbon, see Heliskoski, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 93 and Hix, op. cit. supra note 28, at 225.
77. See e.g. recital 8 of the Council Decision 2013/86/EU on the conclusion of the
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety (O.J. 2013, L 46/1).
78. Hix, op. cit. supra note 28, at 241.
79. Czuczai, op. cit. supra note 66, at 244.
80. For examples, see Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 94.
81. On several occasions the Union suggested that the missing ratifications of several
Member States were not problematic because the Council’s approval of the agreement in
question provided a sufficient legal basis for the Union to ratify on behalf of the Member States.
For examples and critique on this practice, see Olson, “Mixity from the outside:The perspective
of a treaty partner”, in Hillion and Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 346.
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agreements preclude or complicate the possibility of “incomplete mixity”
because they require that an “international organization” or “customs union”
can only ratify the agreement once some, or all, of its Member States have
ratified it.82 These “subordination clauses” are problematic as the Union
“becomes the prisoner of its Member States: the latter are in a position to block
the [Union’s] entry into the agreement”.83
4.2. The lack of a delimitation of competences
Another key feature of mixed agreements complicating their “incomplete”
existence is that these agreements do not specify which elements of the
agreements fall within Union competences and which fall within the
competences of the Member States. As noted in the introduction, instead of
first trying to solve endless difficult internal competence questions among EU
institutions or among EU institutions and Member States, mixity allows the
Union (together with the Member State) to go ahead with the agreement and
ignore (or at least delay) an exact delimitation of competences.84 Neither the
mixed agreements themselves, nor the relevant Council decisions define or
list which elements from the agreement fall within Union competences, or
which fall within Member States competences (and are thus the source of the
mixed nature of the agreement).85 A few Council decisions only refer to the
participation of Member States in the agreement alongside the Union,86 or
explain in general terms that the agreement is only concluded insofar as the
agreement’s provisions fall within Union competences.87 However, the
82. See e.g. Art. 3(1) Annex IX of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (O.J. 1998, L 179/3).
83. Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 3, at 134.
84. Maresceau, op. cit. supra note 13, at 12.
85. It has to be noted that the explanatory memorandum of the Commission proposal of a
Council decision for the singing and/or conclusion of a mixed agreement sometimes gives an
indication of the provisions which the Commission considers as not falling within Union
competences, and thus lead to mixity. See e.g. the Commission’s proposal for a Council
Decision on the signature and provisional application of the EU-Korea FTA, which identifies
the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation as being responsible for the mixed nature of the agreement
(COM (2010)136).
86. E.g., the Council Decision 2010/48/EC concerning the conclusion of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities states that “both the Community
and its Member States have competence in the fields covered by the UN Convention. The
Community and the Member States should therefore become Contracting Parties to it, so that
together they can fulfil the obligations laid down by the UN Convention and exercise the rights
invested in them, in situations of mixed competence in a coherent manner.”
87. Such a disclaimer was for the first time used in the Council Decision 94/800/EC on the
conclusion of the WTO Agreement and its Annexes, which states that these agreements “are
hereby approved on behalf of the European Community with regard to that portion of them
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decisions concerned – or the text of the mixed agreements – do not provide a
clear-cut demarcation between the competences of the Union and the Member
States. Apart from the mentioned political pragmatism, there are also legal
reasons why an exact demarcation of competences is avoided. Such a division
of competences in definitive terms would ignore the dynamic character of the
Union’s competences in the area of external relations. In particular, the ERTA
effect, codified in the third paragraph of Article 3(2) TFEU, incorporates a
dynamic element, as every time the Union adopts an internal measure, the
Member States broaden the Union’s exclusive competences with regard to
that issue. The Court argued that due to this dynamic character it is not
necessary to set out and determine the division of competences between the
Member States and the Union with regard to the conclusion of a mixed
agreement.88 It is therefore better for the Union to avoid a clear delimitation of
competences as this would “freeze” the Union’s competences.89
Nevertheless, two features of mixed agreements may give an indication of
the delimitation of competences between the EU and its Member States, albeit
that both of them fail to do so in any clear fashion. The first is the declarations
of competence adopted by the Union in the context of the conclusion of
multilateral mixed agreements. The lack of division of competences in the
mixed formula can create situations of uncertainty for third parties. They
mainly wish to know who (i.e. the EU or the Member States) will have the
competence (e.g. voting rights, ensuring compliance, and responsibility for a
breach of the agreement) over which provisions of the agreement. To
accommodate these concerns, a practice has been developed by the Union to
adopt declarations of competence when concluding multilateral mixed
agreements.These declarations aim to clarify the scope of the competence and
responsibility of the EU and the Member States over specific provisions or
chapters of the agreement.90 They are actually required by participation
clauses included in most multilateral agreements. These clauses spell out the
conditions under which international organizations or Regional Economic
Integration Organizations (REIO) such as the EU can participate in the
agreement.91 Participation clauses often include an obligation to declare the
which falls within the competence of the European Community” (O.J. 1994, L 336). For a more
recent example, see Council Decisions 2008/801/EC on the conclusion of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (O.J. 2008, L 287).
88. Ruling 1/78, EU:C:1978:202, para 35.
89. Dolmans, op. cit. supra note 26, at 52.
90. For a detailed analysis, see Delgado Casteleiro, op. cit. supra note 4.
91. The most recent declaration of competences was adopted for the conclusion of the Paris
Agreement (O.J. 2016, L 282/4). For a list of declarations of competences adopted by the EU in
the context of the conclusion of mixed multilateral agreements, see the EU Treaties Office
Database: <ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do>.
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extent of the competence when both the REIO and at least one of its Members
are parties to the agreement.92
However, although the ECJ increasingly relies on declarations of
competence when interpreting mixed agreements93 or unravelling the EU’s
external competences,94 they are widely criticized.95 Mainly due to the
dynamic nature of the EU’s external competences and the complexities
related to competences the Union shares with the Member States, the
declarations are considered too vague96 and said to “suffer from a lack of
clarity and elegance”.97 They fail to clarify when the EU has competence, but
often instead create more uncertainty.98
The second aspect of mixed agreements which gives an indication on the
delimitation of competences is the scope of the provisional application of
mixed agreements. Again, however, this picture is far from perfect. The
provisional application of mixed agreements, further discussed below, can
only cover the elements of the agreement falling within Union competences
(exclusive or shared), unless the Member States declare that they will also
provisionally apply those elements falling within their competences.99 Several
mixed agreements even allow only the Union and the third party to
provisionally apply the agreement, excluding this possibility for the Member
92. See e.g. Art. 5.1 Annex IX UNCLOS, cited supra note 82.
93. Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenieVLK v.Ministerstvo zivotného prostredia
Slovenskej republiky (LZ), EU:C:2011:125; Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (MOX
Plant).
94. E.g. Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS) Case C-29/99, Commission v.
Council (Convention on Nuclear Safety), EU:C:2002:734; Case C-94/03, Commission v.
Council (Rotterdam Convention), EU:C:2006:2; and Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol),
EU:C:2001:664.
95. De Witte, “Too much constitutional law in the European Union’s foreign relations?”, in
Cremona and De Witte (Eds.)EUForeign Relations Law –Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart,
2008), 3–15, at 15; Olson, op. cit. supra note 81, at 335; Rosas, “Exclusive, shared and national
competences in the context of EU external relations: Do such distinctions matter?”, in Govaere,
Lannon, et al. op. cit. supra note 15, at p. 30.
96. E.g., several declarations simply refer to the relevant Treaty articles and the principle of
implied powers as established by the Court (e.g. the declaration on competences with respect to
UNCLOS, O.J. 1998, L 179/1).
97. Opinion of A.G. Maduro in Case C-459/03 (MOX Plant), EU:C:2006:42, para 36.
98. Delgado Casteleiro, op. cit. supra note 4.
99. However, the Member States’ provisional application cannot be approved in the same
act as concerning the Union’s provisional application. The Court annulled in Case 28/12,
Commission v. Council such a hybrid decision (i.e. a decision on signature and provisional
application adopted by both the Council and the Representatives of the Governments and of the
Member States meeting within the Council) because, inter alia, this is not compatible with the
principles of institutional balance (Art. 13(2) TEU) and the procedural rules for the conclusion
of an agreement (Art. 218 TFEU).
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States.100 Be that as it may, this does not mean that the provisions listed in the
Council decision for signature and provisional application give a complete
overview of the elements of the agreement falling within Union competences.
A practise has been developed in which for broad framework agreements such
as Association Agreements and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements –
which are in principle concluded as mixed agreements – the trade-related
provisions provisionally enter into force.101 Another option which has been
used by the EU to alleviate the negative effect of mixity, is to sign and formally
conclude a separate agreement (often called an “Interim Agreement”)
incorporating the trade-related elements of the agreement.102 These
trade-related elements indeed squarely fall within the EU’s exclusive
competences. At the same time, these agreements include several other
provisions falling within Union competences, but which are for political
reasons not provisionally applied.103 The scope of the provisional application
of bilateral mixed agreements broadened over the years, often going beyond
trade-related elements into areas ranging from economic cooperation,
political dialogue to even CFSP.104 In order to accommodate the concerns of
several Member States that the scope of the provisional application would also
touch upon Member State competences, the Council decisions on signature
and provisional application now state that the listed provisions shall only
100. See e.g. Art. 58(2) of the EU-New Zealand Partnership Agreement on Relations and
Cooperation (O.J. 2016, L 304/1); and Art. 86(3) of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and
Cooperation Agreement (O.J. 2016, L 337/1). However, other mixed agreements allow “the
Parties” (thus the EU and the Member States) to provisionally apply the agreement (e.g. Art.
30.7(3)(a) CETA). Nevertheless, this provision should be read together with the provision that
defines “the Parties” (agreements cited supra note 32).
101. E.g., with regard to the EU-Central America AA, only part IV on trade is provisionally
applied (with the exception of Art. 271 on criminal enforcement of IPR) (O.J. 2012, L 346/1).
The provisional application of the EU-Chile AA covers in addition to trade-related provisions
also institutional provisions (O.J. 2002, L 352/1).
102. Such “Interim Agreements on trade and trade-related matters” were for example
concluded for the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) concluded with the
Western Balkan countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) and the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the post-Soviet countries, e.g. SAA
Serbia (O.J. 2010, L 28/1); EMAA Lebanon (O.J. 2002, L 262/2) and PCA Russia (O.J. 1995, L
247/2). On this issue, see Flaesch-Mougin and Bosse-Platière, “L’application provisoire des
accords de l’Union européenne”, in Govaere, Lannon, et al., op. cit. supra note 15, 293–323.
103. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area. A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration without membership
(Brill/Nijhoff, 2016) at p. 123.
104. See e.g. the provisional application of the EU-Ukraine AA (combined reading of the
Council Decision 2014/295/EU and Council Decision 2014/668/EU) (on this issue, see the
comments of Van der Loo, ibid.). For other examples, see the scope of the provisional
application of the EU-New Zealand Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation
(Council Decision 2016/1970/EU, O.J. 2016, L 304/1) and the Enhanced Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan (Council Decision 2016/123/EU, O.J. 2016, 29/1).
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provisionally apply “to the extent that they cover matters falling within the
Union’s competence, including matters falling within the Union’s
competence to define and implement a common foreign and security
policy”.105 Several Council decisions even explicitly state that “the
provisional application of parts of the Agreement does not prejudge the
allocation of competences between the Union and its Member States in
accordance with the Treaties”.106 It is thus clear that the scope of the
provisional application of mixed agreements provides little insight into the
division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Moreover,
the Council is not always consistent in defining the scope of provisional
application as it has already provisionally applied provisions in the context of
several recent mixed FTAs, although it argues at the same time in the
proceedings in Opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore FreeTradeAgreement, that these
provisions fall within the competences of the Member States.107 Finally, some
Council decisions simply state that “elements falling within the competences
of the [Union]” will be provisionally applied, without indicating which
provision this concerns,108 and some mixed agreements are even provisionally
applied in their entirety.109
The lack of a clear demarcation of competences in mixed agreements has
been criticized.110 It is argued that this leads to the Union’s autonomy being
undermined as conditions are being created allowing Member States to
105. See e.g. the Council decisions mentioned in the previous note.
106. See e.g. Council Decision 2016/2232/EU on the signing on the EU-Cuba Political
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (O.J. 2016, L 337/1). A similar formulation can also be
found in Council Decision 2017/38 on the provisional application of CETA (O.J. 2017, L
11/1080). The Council and Member States also adopted numerous Statements and Declarations
to the Council minutes in which they emphasize that the provisional application of the
agreement in several areas such as transport and moral rights does not prejudge the allocation
of competences between the EU and the Member States. On the various statements, see Van
der Loo, “CETA’s signature: 38 statements, a joint interpretative instrument and an uncertain
future”, CEPS Commentary, 31 Oct. 2016.
107. Kleimann and Kübek, op. cit. supra note 26, 17. These authors give the example of
portfolio investment, which is included in the scope of provisional application of the EU-Korea
FTA. However, the Council avoided the provisional application of the provisions on investment
protection and portfolio investment in CETA in anticipation of Opinion 2/15.
108. Council Decision 2016/1850/EU on the signature and provisional application of the
stepping stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana, of the one part, and the
European Community and its Member States, of the other part (O.J. 2016, L 287/3).
109. See e.g. Council Decision 2013/40/EU on the signing and provisional application of
the EU-Korea Framework Agreement. The Council Decision on the Cuba Political Dialogue
and Cooperation Agreement provisionally applies the agreement “in whole” (see supra note
106). It can be argued that this can only mean that the provisional application covers elements
falling within Member States’ competences, or the agreement is mixed despite the fact that it
does not cover Member States’ competences.
110. Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 3, at 98.
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interfere with (exclusive) Union competences (cf. above). Therefore, it is in
the EU’s interest to define the division of competences under a mixed
agreement as clearly as possible, while respecting the dynamic nature of these
competences.111 Although this difficult exercise would perhaps render mixity
a less attractive option, it would improve transparency and legal certainty in
the Member States’ domestic ratification procedures. Whereas, in principle,
these national procedures only need to ratify those parts of the agreement that
fall within the competences of the Member States, the different national
ratification or approval acts do not specify which elements of the agreement
they cover. At best, some preparatory documents (e.g. reports of
parliamentary committees) refer to some provisions that fall within exclusive
Member State competences (and thus trigger mixity), but without providing
an overall demarcation of competences.112
It is difficult for national parliaments to properly exercise their
constitutional role in the national ratification process (all Member States with
the exception of the UK require parliamentary approval),113 if they have no
clear idea which provisions of the agreement they need to consider for
approval.Therefore, in practice, national parliaments consider the entire scope
of mixed agreements instead of only those provisions that fall outside the
Union’s competences. This was also clearly illustrated by the Dutch
referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Whereas the
pre-referendum campaign revolved around the question whether or not to
approve the Association Agreement, the subject of the referendum was
actually the national approval act which would allow for ratification of the
Member States’ elements of the Association Agreement for the Kingdom of
the Netherlands.114 Because this approval act also did not specify
111. Dolmans, op. cit. supra note 26, at 52.
112. See e.g. “Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Étrangères [France] sur
le projet de loi autorisant la ratification de l’accord d’association entre l’Union européenne et
la Communauté européenne de l’énergie atomique et leurs États membres, d’une part, et la
République de Moldavie, d’autre part, No. 2667, 18 March 2015”. This report mentions Art. 9
of this agreement on “national export controls as well as transit of WMD-related goods” as an
example of an element of the agreement that falls within Member States’ competences, and thus
triggers mixity. Some national parliamentary approval procedures of mixed agreements
struggle with such a lack of competence demarcation and ask for specifications or more
detailed information with regard to the Union’s competences for the conclusion of the
agreement (UK Parliament, European Scrutiny Committee, Twenty-Fourth Report, DFID
(36339), Committee’s conclusions on the Economic Partnership Agreement with the West
African region, 3 Dec. 2014).
113. Kuijper, Of ‘Mixity’ and ‘Double-Hatting’: EU External Relations Law Explained
(Vossiuspers Uva, 2008), p. 11.
114. Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Jaargang 2015 (315), “Wet van 8 juli
2015, houdende goedkeuring van de op 27 juni 2014 te Brussel tot stand gekomen
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which parts of the Association Agreement it covered,115 from a strict legal
point of view, the Dutch citizens could not know what they were voting for.
Therefore, Kuijper argues that also the national approval acts should include a
disclaimer stating that this legal instrument only approves those elements of
the agreement falling within the competences of the Member States,116 similar
to the EU practice in some Council decisions.117 According to Kuijper such a
vague phrase leaves room for some difference of judgement about where the
frontier between exclusive EU competences and Member State competences
exactly lies, while nevertheless indicating the intention to respect this border.
He rightfully notes that this would make the non-ratification by a Member
State less dramatic, since the partner State would know that the Union would
be able to implement a large part of the agreement, as long as the Union has
concluded the agreement. Whereas such a vague delimitation of competences
would indeed facilitate incomplete mixity, the procedural provision in
bilateral mixed agreements would still need to be modified in the sense that
not all the Parties need to ratify the agreement before they can enter into force.
5. Provisional application
The non-ratification by one or several Member States of a mixed agreement
also raises questions as to the impact of such a scenario on the provisional
application of those agreements. As discussed above, in order to circumvent
the long ratification procedure of mixed agreements, a part of the agreement
falling within Union competences is usually provisionally applied. A legal
basis for the provisional application of international agreements concluded by
the EU was included in the Amsterdam Treaty (now Art. 218(5) TFEU). It
reflects Article 25 VCLT, according to which a treaty may provide for such
Associatieovereenkomst tussen de Europese Unie en de Europese Gemeenschap voor
Atoomenergie en haar lidstaten, enerzijds, en Oekraïne, anderzijds”.
115. Only the “Memorie van Toelichting” (i.e. explanatory note) of the approval act
discussed in general terms the mixed nature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
(Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014–2015, 34 116, no. 3). However, in some parliamentary
questions Dutch members of parliament asked their government to clarify the competence
division of the agreement (Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders, “Answers to Members
Omtzigt, Verhoeven, Voordewind on the provisional application of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement”, Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 3 Feb. 2016 and “Kamerbrief verzoek
toelichting bevoegdheidsverdeling EU associatieakkoord Oekraïne”, DIE-0710/2016, 7 Oct.
2016).
116. Kuijper, “Post-CETA: How we got there and how to go on”, ACELG Blog, 28 Oct.
2016, <acelg.blogactiv.eu/2016/10/28/post-ceta-how-we-got-there-and-how-to-go-on-by-pie
ter-jan-kuijper/>
117. See note 87 supra.
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provisional application or the negotiating States may agree to it. As we have
seen, most bilateral mixed agreements indeed include a provision which
allows the Union and the partner country, or “the Parties” (covering also the
Member States), to provisionally apply the agreement “in accordance with
their respective internal procedures and legislation”.118 For the EU this
requires a Council decision, adopted by the Council on the basis of a
Commission proposal.119 The Council decides with QMV, unless the
agreement falls under one of the exceptions mentioned in Article 218(8)
TFEU or if the Council deviates from the Commission proposal.120 The
provisional application is usually approved by the Council decision upon
signing the agreement. This means that a single Member State cannot block
the provisional application of a mixed agreement, unless the agreement falls
under one of the aforementioned situations requiring unanimity. However, in
the case of mixed agreements, a single Member State can nevertheless block
the provisional application of Union competences, even if QMV is required
for the Council’s decision for signature and provisional application of that
agreement by the Union. The Member State can be overruled in the Council,
but by refusing to sign the agreement, it can de facto also veto the provisional
application of parts of the agreement falling within Union competences,
because this can only take place after the signature of the parties.This scenario
almost took place when the Belgian federal government was first unable to
sign CETA after the Walloon “non”. This again could, similar to the situation
of the conclusion of mixed agreements (cf. above), encroach upon the duty of
sincere cooperation, as the Member State would block the Union from
exercising its competences (i.e. provisionally applying those parts of a mixed
agreement falling within Union competences). However, as affirmed above, it
seems unlikely that the duty of cooperation can be interpreted in such a way
that it would oblige the Member States to sign the agreement.
The situation is even more complex if a Member State refuses to ratify an
agreement after it is signed and the provisional application has been initiated.
One can claim that, as long as not all the parties have ratified the agreement,
the provisional application can continue indefinitely. The clauses on
provisional application in mixed agreements or the respective Council
decisions do not impose a “deadline” on the provisional application. However,
the provisional application of (parts of) an agreement provides less legal
certainty compared to the full entry into force of the agreement, especially for
118. However, not all recent bilateral mixed agreements provide for provisional application.
See e.g. the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation with
Vietnam; and the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Philippines
(O.J. 2012, L 134/3) and Mongolia (O.J. 2012, L 134/4).
119. Art. 218(5) TFEU.
120. Art. 293 TFEU.
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the third country, because the provisional application can in several cases be
terminated immediately, contrary to the termination clauses of (mixed)
agreements which require a notice of six months or more. However, several
mixed agreements do include a specific procedure for the termination of the
provisional application, including a notice comparable to the one foreseen in
the respective termination clause.121
The situation would change if a Member State were to deposit a
notification that it will not ratify the agreement. As argued above, considering
the “entry into force clauses” of mixed agreements (which require the
ratification of “all” the contracting parties), this would imply that the
ratification procedure of the agreement has failed and that the agreement
cannot be concluded. Although mixed agreements or their respective Council
decision do not set a time-limit on the provisional application, they often state
that the provisional application can only take place “pending its entry into
force” or “pending the completion of the procedures for its conclusion”.122
Therefore, the failure of the ratification procedure would require the
termination of the provisional application.123 This was also the view of the
Council in one of the many statements adopted in the context of the signature
of CETA. The Council stated in plain terms that:
“If the ratification of CETA fails permanently and definitively because of
a ruling of a constitutional court, or following the completion of other
constitutional processes and formal notification by the government of the
concerned State, provisional application must be and will be terminated.
The necessary steps will be taken in accordance with EU procedures”.124
Moreover, statements by Germany, Poland, Belgium and Austria declare that
as parties to the agreement they can exercise their right to terminate the
provisional application as provided in CETA (Art. 30.7(3)(c)) but also add
that this needs to take place “in accordance with EU procedures”.125 Also the
121. See e.g. the clauses mentioned in the last paragraph of this section (see text to note 130
infra).
122. See e.g. the Council decisions cited supra note 104 with regard the EU-New Zealand
Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation and the EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced PCA.
123. Although not a mixed agreement, this was what happened with the so-called SWIFT
agreement banking data transfers to the USA when it became clear that ratification was not
possible due to a negative vote in the European Parliament. See also Santos Vara, “Transatlantic
counterterrorism cooperation agreements on the transfer of personal data: A test for democratic
accountability in the EU”, in Fahey and Curtin (Eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law:
Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge
University Press, 2014), pp. 256–288 at 271.
124. These different statements were included in the Official Journal (O.J. 2017, L11/9).
125. Ibid.
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German Bundesverfassungsgericht declared in its “Application for a
Preliminary Injunction in the ‘CETA’ Proceedings” that the German Federal
Government has the possibility to terminate the provisional application of the
Agreement “for the Federal Republic of Germany” (thus not for the entire
EU), by means of written notification pursuant to Article 30.7(3)(c).126
While one might argue that Member States are not encroaching upon EU
competences if they, either collectively or individually, decide on the
termination of a provisional application in a field covered by Member State
competences, the fact remains that only matters within the scope of EU
competences are subject to provisional application, which is approved by a
Council decision pursuant to Article 218(5). As the Court has recognized in
Commission v. Council (US Air Transport Agreement), “no competence is
granted to the Member States for the adoption of such a decision”.127 The
Court argued in this case that the Council cannot set aside the procedural rules
laid down in Article 218 TFEU and take the Member States on board in a
decision concerning the EU’s signature and provisional application of a mixed
agreement, not even by invoking the duty of cooperation.128
Thus, only the Union (and not one or more Member States) can terminate
the provisional application of the agreement. The aforementioned statements
indeed underline that the termination needs to take place “in accordance with
EU procedures”. However, it is not entirely clear what the appropriate
procedure would be. Not all mixed agreements include a specific procedure
for the termination of the provisional application.129 Those agreements that do
provide for such a procedure state that “either Party” or “a Party” may
terminate the provisional application by means of a written notification
delivered to the other Party or the Depositary of the agreement.130 Article 218
TFEU does not provide procedural rules for the Union’s termination of the
provisional application of an international agreement. However, it can be
argued that the same procedure should be followed as for the adoption of the
provisional application (i.e.Art. 218(5)TFEU), requiring a qualified majority,
126. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Applications for a Preliminary Injunction in the “CETA”
Proceedings Unsuccessful, Press Release No. 71/2016 of 13 Oct. 2016.
127. Case C-28/12, Commission v. Council, para 44.
128. Ibid., para 55.
129. E.g. the EU-New Zealand Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (O.J.
2016, L 321/3), as well as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Iraq (O.J. 2012, L
204/20). However, the provisional application of these agreements can be terminated pursuant
to Art. 25(2) VCLT.
130. E.g., in the case of the Ukraine AA, the termination of the provisional application shall
take place six months after receipt of the notification (Art. 486(7)) and in the case of CETA the
termination shall take effect on the first day of the second month following that notification
(Art. 30.7(3)(c)). Cf. also Art. 281(10) of the Enhanced PCA with Kazakhstan (O.J. 2016, L
29/1).
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and in several cases even unanimity (Art. 218(8) TFEU), within the
Council.131 Therefore, a single Member State cannot terminate the provisional
application of a mixed agreement.
6. Alternative solutions
The above sections reveal the complexities surrounding “incomplete mixity”.
The clauses on entry into force of the existing bilateral mixed agreements
preclude incomplete mixity and it remains difficult (and perhaps even
undesirable) to define the exact division of competences. The present section
aims to assess a number of alternative solutions to overcome possible
deadlocks.
6.1. “Unsigning” an agreement
While not excluded by the law of treaties,132 the “consent to be bound” to the
type of international agreements referred to in this contribution is usually not
expressed through the signing of the agreement, but through ratification. As
we have seen, usually, agreements enter into force once all (in the case of
bilateral mixed agreements) or a number of the signatory States (in the case of
large multilateral agreements) have ratified the agreements. This implies that
legal obligations upon signature are usually limited to the general rule laid
down in Article 18 VCLT “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty”. However, when the entry into force of an
international agreement is “unduly delayed”, a State may have good
arguments to ignore (parts of) this obligation. In any case, it is clear that before
the “consent to be bound” has been expressed, a State is not a party to the
agreement.
As we have seen, the problem may be that non-ratification by one of the
signatory States may block the entry into force of the agreement. Obviously, in
some cases “unsigning” an agreement would solve matters, but this is not the
case when (as with bilateral mixed agreements) the entry into force is
dependent on all parties, including the EU and all its Member States. The best
moment for a Member State to raise objections would of course be before
negotiations (and include these in the Council’s negotiating mandate for the
Commission), or during the negotiations in the specific Council Committee
131. Kuijper however argues that provisional application can be terminated by either party
without further notice and without giving reason on the basis of Art. 25(2) VCLT (see Kuijper
op. cit. supra note 113).
132. See Arts. 11 and 12 VLCT.
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that monitors the EU’s negotiator. After negotiations have been concluded, the
agreed text is usually “initialled” by the parties. Under international law,
initialling confirms that both parties agree that the wording contained in the
document initialled is the wording they agreed. Initialling does not imply
consent to subsequent signature or ratification.133 While, as a rule, the Council
and the European Parliament are informed as soon as the agreement is
initialled and are provided with the text (at the latest when the Commission
adopts the Commission proposal for signing the agreement), a Council
decision is not required prior to the initialling. A Member State also has the
possibility to raise issues in the Council at the moment of the adoption of the
Council decision allowing the EU to sign the agreement. However, only in the
limited number of situations where unanimity is required in the Council for
the signing and conclusion of the agreement134 is a Member State able to veto
the agreement.
6.2. Opt-outs
Opt-outs (or in fact “reservations” in treaty law parlance), either in the text of
the agreement or in a separate Protocol, can provide Member States with a
solution to claim exceptions for parts of the obligations that it cannot or would
not like to be bound by.135 Yet, when the option of reservations is not
mentioned by the agreement and the absence of a reservation may be assumed
to have been part of the “consent to be bound” of other parties, it becomes
difficult to raise it at a later stage.136 The reason for this is clear: other parties
and their Parliaments have approved (and possibly already ratified) the
agreement on the basis of the idea that the rules would count for everyone who
had not raised objections prior to the conclusion of the agreement. This is
exactly the reason why opt-outs and other deviations from general rules are
usually part of the negotiations and end up as parts of the end-result. This also
explains why the UK/Ireland and Denmark’s opt-outs from provisions (and
implementing measures) of a mixed agreement falling under the AFSJ
(pursuant to, respectively, Protocol 21 and 22 to the Lisbon Treaty) is
133. Cf. Art. 10 VLCT.
134. See note 56 supra.
135. Compare Art. 20 VLCT. Well-known examples are the Protocols annexed to the EU
Treaties, allowing certain Member States not to take part in specific parts of the Treaties, such
as Protocol No. 21 on The Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in Respect of the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice.
136. Art. 20(2) VLCT: “When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States
and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all
the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a
reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.”
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generally addressed not only in the respective Council decision, but also in the
preamble of the agreement.137
A possible way out is offered by Article 20(4) VLCT, but only if the above
situation does not apply: parties may accept a later reservation once it is not
considered to have formed an essential part of the own considerations to ratify
the agreement. It is important to underline that statements made by Council
members during the conclusion of an agreement are valid only as unilateral
interpretations of certain elements in the agreement. They cannot give a
binding interpretation to an international agreement, nor do they constitute
binding EU acts. While these interpretations may be helpful for the other
parties to understand how a particular EU Member State views a certain
provision, and they could even be used by the Court in a contextual sense, they
will never be able to set aside the agreed text of an agreement, unless it “was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty” (Art.
31(2)(b) VCLT).
Translated to the Dutch situation in relation to the EU-Ukraine AA, a Dutch
exception could have been accepted once the other parties agreed that the full
participation of the Netherlands had not been a condition for their own
ratification of the agreement. This will hardly be the case in relation to EU
agreements which have been negotiated on the basis of a mandate by the
Council and which are meant to be signed and ratified by all. In other words:
one may assume that each and every Parliament approves, and each
government ratifies, the agreement on the assumption that exactly the same
rights and obligations will be valid for all other parties. In short – irrespective
of any substantive problems related to the fact that not all parties will have the
same obligations – acceptance of ex post facto opt-outs would run counter to
complex legal issues.
6.3. Declarations
Apart from opt-outs, “Declarations” may be attached to the text upon
conclusion. In contrast to Protocols, these Declarations do not change the
legal regime as such, but merely provide an (individual or joint) interpretation
of certain provisions. In many cases (see the Declarations annexed to the
137. These countries remain however bound by these provisions as separate contracting
Parties (and not as part of the EU), but not to EU-internal measures implementing these
provisions (see e.g. the preamble of the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement (cited
supra note 32). In the case of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, a “split” legal basis was
adopted for the non-discrimination provision of legally employed third country nationals,
which allowed the UK to opt-out for the application of this provision pursuant to Protocol 21.
For a critique on this issue, Van der Loo, op. cit. supra note 103, p. 169.
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TEU) they hardly do more than stating the obvious and often they are (merely)
meant to underline elements that are believed to facilitate the domestic
ratification. Declarations are “legally binding” only in the sense that they
provide an interpretation; they can never set aside the provisions in an
agreement. For example, in order to accommodate the concerns of the
Walloon Government and other CETA opponents, the Union and Canada
adopted a “Joint Interpretative Instrument”.138 This document specifies how
several provisions of CETA should be interpreted, but it does not alter the text
of the agreement. However, because it was agreed jointly with Canada, this
document recognizes that it provides “in the sense of Article 31 VCLT, a clear
and unambiguous statement of what Canada and the EU and its Member
States agreed in a number of CETA provisions.”139 In addition, several
Member States and institutions unilaterally adopted 38 statements that were
annexed to the Council minutes.140 However, as noted above, because these
statements were adopted unilaterally, they cannot provide a binding
interpretation pursuant to Article 31 (2)(b) VCLT.
6.4. Decisions of the Heads of State or Government meeting within the
European Council
Quite surprisingly for many, the EU/Dutch solution to prevent a possible
non-ratification by the Netherlands of the EU-Ukraine AA, was not the
adoption of a Protocol or Declaration, but a “Decision of the Heads of State or
Government of the 28 Member States of the European Union, meeting within
the European Council”.141 This Decision is to take effect once the Netherlands
138. Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States (O.J.
2017, L 11/3).
139. In the context of CETA’s signature, also the Council Legal Service adopted a
statement to the Council minutes in which it recognized that, by virtue of Art. 31(2)(b) VCLT,
the Joint Interpretative Instrument “constitutes a document of reference that will have to be
made use of if any issue arises in the implementation of CETA regarding the interpretation of
its terms. To this effect, it has legal force and a binding character” (see supra note 124).
140. Van der Loo, “CETA’s signature: 38 statements, a joint interpretative instrument and
an uncertain future, CEPS Commentary, 31 Oct. 2016.
141. Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 28 Member States of the
European Union, meeting within the European Council, on the Association Agreement
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member
States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, annexed to the European Council
Conclusions on Ukraine, 15 Dec. 2016. See also Van Elsuwege, “Towards a Solution for the
Ratification Conundrum of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement?”, Verfassungsblog, 16
Dec. 2016 <verfassungsblog.de/towards-a-solution-for-the-ratification-conundrum-of-the-eu-
ukraine-association-agreement/>; as well as Van der Loo (op. cit. supra note 1) and Wessel (op.
cit. supra note 75).
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has ratified the Agreement and the European Union has concluded it.
Decisions like these are taken in the framework of the European Council, and
not by the European Council itself. Like framework decisions taken by the
(regular) Council, they are believed not to need a legal basis in EU law, as the
(European) Council meeting is merely a pragmatic venue to allow the States to
conclude an agreement. Usually, they are needed once decisions cannot
(solely) be taken by the institutions, so that Member States in their capacity as
“States” need to step in.142 Indeed, not being an EU decision, the “Decision”
thus adopted seems to be nothing less than an international agreement.143 This
is confirmed by the fact that: “The European Council notes that the Decision
set out in the Annex is legally binding on the 28 Member States of the
European Union, and may be amended or repealed only by common accord of
their Heads of State or Government”.144 Hence, where the Dutch Government
repeatedly informed the public that it aimed for a “legally binding
declaration”, they ended up with something that seems nothing short of an
additional international agreement; although the Court’s case law on this
point is not conclusive.145 Obviously, once the Decision is indeed in fact an
international agreement, this raises a number of additional questions, in
particular as to the competence of the Member States to conclude an
international agreement in an area that is already covered by EU law. One
could argue that the ERTA effect kicks in here, rendering the instrument
invalid. While it goes beyond the scope of the present contribution to analyse
this in more detail, it is clear that the solution is far from winning the beauty
contest.
Furthermore, one may argue that a solution like this should be discussed
with all parties to an agreement – in this case the EU-Ukraine AA – who
would then have a possibility to find out whether the content of the presumably
142. As noted by the Council’s legal service, this is not the first time that this instrument is
used in a case like this. See e.g. the Decisions of the Heads of State or Government, meeting
within the European Council, taken in December 1992 and in June 2009 to address certain
problems raised by the Government of a Member State following a referendum in that State or
decisions taken by common agreement of the representatives of the Member States, including
at the level of Heads of State or Government, in December 1992, October 1993 and December
2003 on the location of the seats of a number of EU institutions and bodies, in the context of
Art. 341 TFEU. Opinion of the legal counsel, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2016 (OR. en), EUCO 37/16,
LIMITE, JUR 602.
143. Ibid., opinion of the legal counsel: “With regard to its legal nature and effects, the draft
Decision of the Heads of State or Government should, in the present case as well as in previous
instances, be regarded – although it does not require the accomplishment of the formalities
generally needed for self-standing agreements – as an instrument of international law, by which
the EU Member States agree on how they understand and will apply, within their competences,
certain provisions of an act by which they are otherwise all bound.”
144. As set out in the European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, 15 Dec. 2016.
145. See in particular Case C-28/12, Commission v. Council, paras. 15–17.
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new agreement affects the earlier approval by the parties.146 In this particular
case, the “Decision” seems to have solved this dilemma in two ways. First of
all, it (at least) claims to be “in full conformity with the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement and the EU treaties”. Secondly, in a more substantive
sense, the five points merely repeat what is or is not in the treaty, thus making
it a legally less relevant document. Obviously, the Decision could not have
contained elements that would contradict the EU-Ukraine AA or EU law in
general; which puts the “legally binding” nature of the Decision somewhat in
perspective. Not being a reservation, it is “merely” a document in which the
Heads of State and Government of the EU States that are a party to the AA lay
down an agreed interpretation. The Council’s legal service formulated the
legally binding nature as follows:
“It has nevertheless legal force in order to exclude, as among the Member
States of the EU, certain interpretations that could be given to the language
of the agreement and certain forms of action that could be considered on
its basis. In case the EU Court of Justice would have to interpret the
provisions of the association agreement in the future, the draft Decision
could also be used in its reasoning to assess the intentions of the EU
Member States as to the scope of the commitments undertaken when
becoming parties.”147
Obviously, this joint interpretation by the EU State parties does not necessarily
bind the two other parties, the EU and Ukraine. In that sense it can (only) be
seen as a self-binding common understanding which is hard to deny at a later
stage (and, politically, that was most probably the objective). Therefore, this
“Decision” differs from the Joint Interpretative Instrument adopted by the EU
and Canada in the context of the conclusion of CETA, which, as explained
above, can be considered as a binding instrument pursuant to Article 31(2)
VLCT. At the same time, one-sided interpretations may make it more difficult
for the other parties to implement the agreement and at least in the EU
Member State context could trigger the principle of sincere cooperation.
Are “Decisions” like these generally a good solution to deal with the
non-ratification of mixed agreements by certain Member States? The answer
should probably be “no”. In the Dutch case, it prevented a non-ratification; an
actual non-ratification would have implied that the AA could not enter into
force. In that situation, a renegotiation would have been the only option as the
146. Cf. also the view of the Council’s legal counsel: “unless Ukraine declares that it
accepts the Decision, its provisions cannot constitute an interpretative instrument binding on
Ukraine by virtue of Art. 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”. See
Opinion of the legal counsel cited supra note 142.
147. Ibid.
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agreement itself would need to be adapted. In relation to mixed agreements,
the division of competences between the EU and its Member States needs to
be respected and the Court equally has made clear that (Member) States may
not take decisions in the framework of the Council if these would ignore
(procedural) rules of EU law (e.g. related to the conclusion of international
agreements).148 Furthermore, the fact that only a number of parties to an
Agreement get together to prepare a (“binding”) view on what they see as the
interpretation of a number of key elements in the Agreement, after most
parties and their Parliaments have already approved the Agreement, should
not become a habit in EU practice.149
7. Conclusion
The aim of this contribution was to shed more light on situations in which EU
Member States are unable or unwilling to ratify mixed agreements, as well as
on the legal consequences of those situations. While practice so far does not
offer examples of “incomplete” bilateral mixed agreements, both the Dutch
struggle to ratify the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Belgian
problems to sign CETA revealed that it is only a matter of time before we will
be confronted with this problem.
Whereas difficulties are less prominent in the case of multilateral mixed
agreements, “incomplete mixity” is indeed problematic in a bilateral context.
We noted several problems. First of all, so far bilateral mixed agreements have
required that all parties (hence, the EU, the Member States and the third party)
need to ratify the agreement before it can enter into force. To overcome this
problem, parties could agree not to include this rule and allow for a limited
number of EU Member States not to become a party, or to join in at a later
stage. Whereas a full participation of all Member States could be phrased as an
end-goal, certain Member States could be given more time, for instance for
domestic constitutional reasons. In certain cases “incomplete” mixed
agreements should perhaps not be fully excluded, in particular when a
Member States does not agree with certain (key) policies in the agreement
(and which are not covered by the EU’s exclusive competences). Obviously,
this situation should be avoided as it runs counter to the legal as well as
political aspects of consistency that are so central in the EU’s external
relations.
148. See Case C-28/12, Commission v. Council.
149. In fact, after the EU-UK deal on options for UK membership after a remain vote in the
Brexit referendum, and the EU-Turkey deal on refugees, there seems to be a new tendency to let
political solutions prevail over sound legal options.
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In many cases, Member States will not object to the agreement in its
entirety, but only to certain elements. While ideally these potential objections
should be raised during the negotiation phase (in which case they may could
perhaps be tackled through an opt-out or a Declaration), the duration of the
negotiation and concluding process may have allowed for a change of
government and/or parliament in the meantime, or – indeed – a referendum
with an unexpected result. This leads to a situation in which the parties are to
solve the issue after the text has already been agreed upon and, perhaps, a
number of parties have already signed or even concluded the agreement. We
have pointed to different solutions (including the exchange of an additional
instrument on the basis of Art. 13 VLCT and a Decision taken by the Heads of
State and Government in the Framework of the European Council), but it
would be better if the possibility of non-ratification were part of the text of the
agreement and solutions to overcome potential signing or ratification
problems were already addressed during the negotiation phase. This would
imply that for future agreements, the specific entry into force clauses would
perhaps be tweaked so as to allow for incomplete mixity, for a limited period
or perhaps even structurally, depending on the topic. Issues not falling within
EU competences would in this situation not be applied in certain Member
States. This would in any case avoid the “constitutional deadlock” that the
exercise of a Member State’s right not to ratify a mixed agreement would
block the Union from exercising its exclusive competences.
The question remains whether this is an attractive option for third parties,
given their general demand to secure that someone on the EU/Member States
side is always accountable for all parts of the agreement (cf. the preference for
detailed declarations of competence). But one may even wonder whether the
option is attractive for Member States, since avoiding a delimitation of
competences (or securing Member States involvement in EU matters) may
have been part of the reason why mixity was opted for in the first place. At the
same time, we should not forget that even in a case of non-ratification,
Member States would remain bound by the “EU parts” of the agreement on
the basis of Union law (Art. 216(2) TFEU).
The second and related main problem we drew attention to is the lack of a
clear delimitation of competences. As we have seen, even in relation to the
provisional application of mixed agreements, the EU and its Member States
have not been able or willing to clearly demarcate their field of competence. In
this situation it is difficult to see incomplete mixed agreements as a solution.
After all, to which parts exactly would a Member State not be bound? And,
given the increasing inter-linkage between the different EU external relations
post-Lisbon, it is perhaps not even desirable to seek for too strict lines of
demarcation. An option would be to allow for incomplete mixity on the basis
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of a Council decision that approves the agreement “for those areas of the
agreement falling within Union competences”, but which avoids a clear-cut
demarcation of competences. Also the national approval acts should indicate
that they only ratify those parts of the agreement not covered by Union
competences. Whereas such a solution would still avoid competence battles
and would respect the dynamic nature of the Union’s external competences, it
would create legal uncertainty for all parties involved.
Overall, the conclusion on the basis of our analysis is that the Union and its
Member States should prevent having to find ex post facto solutions for
non-ratification problems. Indeed, mixity is here to stay and the same seems to
hold true for the awareness by national parliaments and European citizens that
international agreements may affect their daily lives (for good and sometimes
for bad). The current Zeitgeist seems to dictate an involvement of the national
parliaments and European citizens from the outset, since only giving them a
voice on the result of negotiations may lead to problems at a far too late stage.
While referendums on negotiation mandates are perhaps not the best solution,
it would make sense to start thinking about a wider, perhaps informal,
involvement of national parliaments on the objectives of the negotiations
before the negotiating directives are adopted by the Council, in particular if
these deal with a (presumably) mixed agreement. Together with the European
Parliament, these national parliaments would then be provided with a
possibility to debate the various aspects of new agreements and signal
potential problems at an earlier stage.
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